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NOTES

THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD: REDISTRICTING IN
LIGHT OF Shaw v. Reno
INTRODUCTION

The county manager takes a deep breath and removes the latest census figures from his desk drawer. He turns op the computer and begins to input the census data into the specialized
program containing the geographical contours of his county,
including township lines and neighborhood descriptions. The program also contains instructions designed to bring any districts
into compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (hereinafter
"the VRA").l The VRA covers his county, along with forty other
counties in North Carolina. 2 Under the VRA, the United States
Attorney General must pre approve (pre-clear) the redistricting
plan for the election of county commissioners, as well as any other
electoral changes, prior to the plan's implementation.3
The census figures ..trouble the county manager because they
indicate that forty-five percent of the county's citizens are members of a minority group, and the enclaves of minority voters are
widely dispersed throughout the county. Because the measure of
discriminatory dilution is no longer whether a discriminatory
motive exists in the minds of the redistricting body but solely
whether a discriminatory impact is felt by a protected minority
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (1988).
2. Section Five of the VRA establishes the criteria for determining which
jurisdictions are covered by the Act. The covered jurisdictions are listed in 28
C.F.R. § 51 (1991).
,
3. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). Approval of
changes in election districts actually occurs at the level of the Assistant Attorney
. 2816, 2818 (1993).
General for the Civil Rights Division. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct
An alternative mechanism for approval of the redistricting plan is to apply to the
District Court for the District of Columbia for injunctive relief against
enforcement of the act by federal officers. 42 U.S.C. § 19731(b) (1988).
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group,4 he must be especially careful not to dilute minority voting
strength, which would ensure disapproval by the Attorney General. While adding line after line of computer code to his program,
the county manager must also address "one man, one vote" considerations which require voting districts to be roughly equal in size. 5
Only after negotiating all the population and vote . dilution
obstacles will he face the most formidable hurdle; approval of the
redistricting plan by the county commissioners. The county commissioners are a contentious bunch who can find true agreement
on only one subject, their desire to retain their status as community leaders. They also happen to be his collective boss.
As the deadline for completion of the redistricting project
approaches, the county manager completes his input of census
data, silently cursing his recent drive to encourage growth in the
county which necessitated these districting changes. As the computer begins digesting its diet of raw numbers, the county attorney walks in the door. The county manager, already relieved th.at
modern technology is attacking this complex redistricting problem, jauntily greets him. The smile on the county manager's face
disappears as the attorney explains the latest Supreme Court
decision on the subject, Shaw u. Reno. 6 His confidence is replaced
with confusion.
.
The purpose of this note is to analyze the impact and scope of
the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Shaw u.
Reno. This Note will attempt to recommend guidelines which will
enable local government officials to negotiate the narrow and
winding path between the standards of the VRA and the ambiguous restrictions set by the Court's decision.
THE CASE

In the 1991 session, the North Carolina General Assembly
approved a redistricting plan based on the results of the 1990 census, resulting in twelve congressional districts.7 Due to 1';rorth
Carolina's dramatic increase in population during the 1980's, the
plan added another district to the eleven districts already in eXistence. 8 The plan included one majority-minority district in the
4. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). For an explanation of vote
dilution under the VRA, see infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
5. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
6. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
7. [d . at 2819.
8. [d. at 2820.
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northeast corner of the state, the first ever in North Carolina. 9
Because the VRA covered some of the counties involved, the plan
was submitted to the United States Attorney General for preclearance. 10
The Assistant United States Attorney General for Civil
Rights, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, formally objected
to the plan, asserting that the General Assembly could have created a second majority-minority district in the south-central to
southeastern part of the state. 11 In response to the failure of the
redistricting plan to receive preapproval, the General Assembly
revised the plan to create a second majority-minority district. 12
The General Assembly reconfigured the First Congressional
District, primarily located in northeastern North Carolina, and
created the Twelfth Congressional District in the industrial/urban
Piedmont stretching along the 1-85 corridor from east of Durham
to Gastonia. 13 Descriptions of Districts One and Twelve have
been numerous and none have been particularly flattering. 14
The plan was subjected to immediate legal attack on several
fronts. In Pope v. Blue,15 the Republican party of North Carolina
launched the first assault, objecting to the plan as an unconstitutional "political gerrymander."16 Under the analysis developed in
Davis v. Bandemer, l7 a federal three-judge district court dis9. [d.
10. [d. at 2818.
11. [d.
12. [d . (citing 1991 N.C. Extra Sess. Laws, Chap. 7 (1991».
13. See map infra at app.
14. District One stretches from the North Carolina-Virginia border southward
nearly to the South Carolina border. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993).
It tapers from a large cohesive unit in the northeast to a thin band in the south.
[d . Along the way fingerlike projections protrude in several places. [d. This
district has been described as resembling "a bug splattered on a windshield," id.
(quoting Political Pornography - II, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at A14), and a
"Rorschach ink-blot test," Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 475 (E.D.N.C. 1992)
(Voorhees, C.J. , concurring in part and dissenting in part).
District Twelve is the more objectionable ofthe two districts. As it meanders
along the 1-85 corridor, District Twelve expands to swallow up predominantly
minority precincts from Durham to Gastonia. Shaw , 113 S. Ct. at 2820. The
result has been described as "serpentine," Shaw ,808 F . Supp. at 476 (Voorhees,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) and "snake-like," Shaw, 113 S.
Ct. at 2820. See map infra at app.
15. 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992).
16. [d. at '395.
17. 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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missed this suit for failure to state a claim for which relief could
be granted. 18
Davis established a two-prong test for determining whether a
complaint is sufficient to allege an unconstitutional "political gerrymander."19 The first prong requires an allegation of "intentional discrimination against an identifiable political groUp."20
The district court found this element present in the multiple allegations that a Democratic-controlled legislature made the redistricting plan. 21
The claim failed, however, on the issue of "an actual discriminatory effect on [the identifiable political] group," the second
prong of the Davis test. 22 The complaint did not allege that the
Republican Party had been removed from the political process
entirely.23 The Supreme Court summarily affirmed this decision. 24
Private residents of Durham also made an attack on the
redistricting plan in Shaw v. Barr .25 Because the plan split Durham County into two congressional districts, the plaintiffs claimed
the plan constituted an unconstitutional "racial gerrymander"
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 26 In a 2-to-1 decision, another federal three-judge district
court dismissed this action, like Pope, on a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. 27
Districts Two and Twelve met with no objections from the
United States Attorney General's office. 28 The action of the Attorney General in pre approving the General Assembly's revised
redistricting plan was challenged in Shaw as well, but the district
court dismissed the claim which asked for an injunction to prevent
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Pope, 809 F. Supp. at 397.
Davis, 478 U.S at 127.
[d .
Pope, 809 F. Supp at 396.
[d.
[d . at 397.
Pope v. Blue, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992).
808 F . Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
26. [d. at 469.
27. [d . at 473. The majority opinion ofthe district court relied upon Supreme
Court precedent in United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430
U.S. 144 (1977). Shaw, 808 F.Supp. at 470. For a discussion of this case, see infra
text accompanying notes 80-104. Chief Judge Richard Voorhees concurred with
most of the majority opinion but dissented on the crucial issue of whether a cause
of action had been asserted under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. [d. at 480.
28. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 467.
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enforcement of the VRA by the Attorney General. 29 The rationale
used by the lower court in dismissing the claim against the Attorney General, left undisturbed by the Supreme Court, was a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 30 All three district court judges
agreed Section 14(b) of the VRA vested exclusive jurisdiction over
claims against the Attorney General's office in the District Court
for the District ofColumbia.31 This provision applies regardless of
the plaintiffs' attempt to construe his action as an effort to secure
a declaratory judgment rather than an attack on Section Five
enforcement. 32
Two of the judges further determined dismissal appropriate
because the action against the Attorney General involved a challenge to the discretionary power given the Attorney General under
Section Five of the VRA.33 This type of action also failed to state a
claim because such a challenge is not subject to judicial review. 34
The Supreme Court35 noted jurisdiction over the Equal Protection issue. 36 The Court reversed the district court's decision;
the complaint stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause
by alleging the redistricting scheme was so irrational on its face
that it could only be understood as an effort to segregate voters on
the basis of race. 37
BACKGROUND

A.

The Voting Rights 4 ct of 1965

The VRA is the legislative mechanism which gave actual
enfranchisement to minority voters and brought to fruition the
ideals originally expressed in the post-Civil War amendments to
29. [d. at 466.
30. [d. (citing Morris v. Gresette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977)).
31. [d . The Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 14(b), 42 U.S.C. 19731(b) (1988),
states: "[N]o court other than the District Court for the District of Columbia .. .
shall have jurisdiction to issue any . . . restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction against the execution or enforcement of [Section 5 of the
VRA] or any action of any Federal officer or employee pursuant thereto.» [d.
32. Shaw , 808 F. Supp. at 466.
33. [d. at 467.
34. [d. (citing Morris, 432 U.S. at 506).
35. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals did not review the decision as the
VRA provides direct appeal to the Supreme Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(3)(g) (1988).
36. Shaw v. Barr, 113 S. Ct. 653 (1992). Defendant's name was changed to
Reno to reflect the appointment of Janet Reno as U.S. Attorney General.
37. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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the Constitution. 38 The Act prescribed strong medicine to remedy
the "insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated ...
through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution"
by white majorities in the South.39
The teeth of the VRA originally resided solely in Section Section
Five requires that any jurisdiction covered by the
Five. 40
VRA41 which adopts new voting "practice[s] or procedure[s]" to
have the new procedure preapproved as nondiscriminatory.42 The
jurisdiction may obtain this preapproval, prior to implementation,
either by a declaratory judgment of the District Court for the District of Columbia or by administrative approval ("pre~clearance")
of the Attorney General. 43 The Supreme Court upheld this drastic
provision as constitutional in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. 44
Following Katzenbach, the majority of litigation surrounding
the VRA has focused on the appropriate standard of review in
determining whether a new voting "practice or procedure" violates
the VRA.45 The standard applied by the District Court for the Dis~'
trict of Columbia or the United States Attorney General in deter-

mining ~I
Section F

IIi UI

amended
just thosE
vided tha
cedures VI
the circu
judging a

•• 1

38. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV and XV.
39. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (upholding the
constitutionality of the VRA).
40. 79 Stat. 439 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988)).
41. Covered jurisdictions are defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1988), as those
jurisdictions which had in place ari'y voting test and in which less than fifty
percent of the voting age population was registered to vote (or had actually voted
in the 1972 presidential election) as of November 1, 1972. See 28 C.F.R. § 51
(1991), for the complete list of covered jurisdictions as determined by the Justice
Department; see also Robert Bryson Carter, Note, Mere Voting: Etowah County
Commission and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 71 N.C. L. REV. 569, 572 n.38
(1993).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1988).
43. Id. at § 1973c. The statute further requires that the declaratory judgment
be made by a three-judge panel and that "any appeal shall lie to the Supreme
Court." Id . There has been a substantial amount oflitigation on the question of
which changes constitute a "practice or procedure" under the VRA. Becaus.e
redistricting clearly falls into this category, the controversy is beyond the scope
of this note. For a discussion of this issue, see Carter, supra note 41.
44. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). The Court allowed the apparent violation of the
Tenth Amendment because "[t]he gist of the matter is that the Fifteenth
Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power." Id. at 325.
45. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992); Beer v.
United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S.
544 (1969); see also Carter, supra note 41.
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mining whether a state voting change is discriminatory under
Section Five is whether the state action is "non-retrogressive."46
In 1982, Congress amended the VRA.47 The most prominent
amended feature is the expansion of Section Two to all states, not
just those covered by Section Five. 48 Originally, Section Two provided that no state could make changes to voting practices or procedures with discriminatory intent as inferred from the "totality of
the circumstances."49 With the amendment, the standard for
judging a violation of the Act under Section Two became one of
"discriminatory effect" rather than "discriminatory intent."5o
Thornburg v. Gingles 51 established Section Two's prohibited
discrIminatory effect as vote dilution, the impairment of the "ability of a protected class to elect its candidate of choice on an equal
basis with other voters."52 The Thornburg test for determining if
vote dilution has occurred consists of three elements: 1) "that [the
protected class] is sufficiently large 'and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district"; 2) "that it is
politically cohesive" and 3) "that the white majority votes suffi46. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. Under Beer, a state may not gain preclearance
under Section Five if the change in voting procedure will result in "a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective
exercise" of the right to vote. Id. "Retrogression" is defined in WEBSTER'S NEW
UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1549 (2d ed. 1983), as "the act of going
backward." In the context of voting rights, retrogression connotes a reversal of
progress on voting equality by reduction in the participation of minorities in the
electoral process.
47. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988» .
48. Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had
Said: "When It Comes To Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only
Thing"?, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1238-39 (1993).
49. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973); see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U.S. 613 (1982). The specific language in the original Section Two was that "[n]o
voting qualification ... shall be imposed by any State . .. to deny or abridge the
right of any citizen ... to vote on account of race." Grofman, supra note 48, at
1239 n.6 (emphasis added). The test under the original Section Two was located
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). The amended Section Two provides that "[n]o
voting qualification . .. shall be imposed by any State . . . in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen . .. to vote on account
of race." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
51. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
52. Id. at 47. Thornburg, another North Carolina case, concerned multimember voting districts. Id . at 32.
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l
reach
out" ,
them

ciently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate."53
Thus the VRA requires states, including North Carolina, who
are covered by Section Five, to comply both with Section Five, by
preclearing any change in voting procedures and meeting the
standard of "non-retrogression", and Section Two, by satisfying
the Thornburg vote dilution test. However, compliance with all
the Sections of the VRA is not sufficient to immunize a voting procedure from challenge, as independent constitutional challenges
may exist under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 54

B.

II

that 1
was ,
could
that I

Constitutional Challenges to Legislative Districting
1.

Gomillion v. Lightfoot

In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,55 black voters in Tuskegee, Alabama alleged the state of Alabama discriminated against them in
violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment and denied them the right to vote in contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment. 56 This discrimination
occurred in 1957 when the Alabama Legislature passed LocalAct
140, redrawing the boundaries of the municipality of Tuskegee. 57
Local Act 140 altered Tuskegee's boundaries "from a square to
an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure."58 Justice Frankfurter,
writing for the Court, found this reconfiguration to exclude all but
"four or five of its 400" ..black voters while excluding none of the
white voters. 59 The only rational conclusion which could be
53. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50-51. Explaining application of this test to
single-member districts, Justice Scalia reasons that a "geographically compact
minority," "minority political cohesion," and "majority bloc voting" must be
established or there "neither has been a wrong nor can [there] be a remedy."
Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1091 (1993) (quoting Thornburg, 478 U.S. at
50-51); see also Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (providing that pre-clearance or declaratory
judgment does not bar subsequent suit); Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S.
544, 549 (1969) ("private parties may enjoin the enforcement of the new
enactment . . . in traditional suits attacking its constitutionality"). A direct
attack on the constitutionality of the voting procedure, as opposed to an attack
under the VRA, was the basis of the suit in Shaw v. Reno. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
55. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
56. [d. at 340.
57. [d.
58. [d . .
59. [d. at 341.
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reached was that Local Act 140 was solely designed for "fencingout" black voters from the city of Tuskegee, thereby depriving
them of their municipal vote.60
In response to the plaintiffs' allegations, the state asserted
that Supreme Court precedent established that municipal power
was unlimited regarding its boundaries. 61 Therefore, the Court
could not overrule Local Act 140. 62 Justice Frankfurter answered
that "[l]egislative control of municipalities, no less than other
state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed
by the United States Constitution."63 . The Court found that Local
Act 140 violated the Fifteenth Amendment without mentioning
the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations. 64
In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Whittaker determined Local Act 140 was a violation, not of the Fifteenth Amendment, but of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 65 He found troubling the fact the right to vote had
not actually been taken away but merely shifted to a new political
subdivision. 66 In his opinion, the violation was that described in
Brown u. Board of Education 67 and Cooper u. Aaron ,68 an "unlawful segregation."69 The rationale and grounds for Justice Whittaker's concurrence proved to be more persuasive than the rationale
of the majority (opinion. Subsequent cases evaluated alleged racial
gerrymanders primarily under the Equal Protection Clause. 7o
60. Id.
61. Id .
62. Id. at 343. The state relied upon Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161
(1907) (holding that the unlimited power of a municipality to consolidate with
another city did not give rise to Due Process violations with regard to tax
increases resulting from the merger). Id.
63. Gomillion , 364 U.S. at 344-45. "It has long been recognized in cases which
have prohibited a State from exploiting a power acknowledged to be absolute in
an isolated context to justify the imposition of an 'unconstitutional condition.' "
Id. at 346.
64. Id. at 347.
65. Id . at 349 (Whittaker, J. , concurring).
66.Id.
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
68. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
69. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
70. See infra notes 71-104 and accompanying text. Though violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment constitute the primary grounds for redistricting
challenges since Gomillion, plaintiffs still allege Fifteenth Amendment violations
(as well as a plethora of other violations under the VRA) which are generally
ignored by the Court. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
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Wright v. Rockefeller

Challenges to congressional redistricting plans were first
addressed in Wright v. Rockefeller. 71 In 1961, New York reapportioned the congressional districts on Manhattan Island to create
one majority non-white district and three majority white districts. 72 Minority voters objected to the districting plan; they contended the lines drawn by the New York Legislature were
motivated by considerations of race in segregating an area with a
high percentage of non-white voters into three districts. 73 This
configuration gave minority voters a majority in only one district
and created one overwhelmingly white district. 74
The majority opinion, written by Justice Black, recognized the
possibility that the congressional district lines had been drawn for
racial reasons but accepted the three-judge district court's assessment of the plaintiffs' failure to meet their burden of proof.1~ ,
Implicitly, the .decision reflects congressional districts drawn
along racial lines present a constitutionally suspect action. 76
Unlike the majority opinion, Justice Douglas' dissent did not:
concern the failure to meet the burden of proof.1 7 Instead, he
found the "zigzag, tortuous lines" drawn to create the majority
white district were only explainable "in racial terms."78 Based on
the character of the district lines .and other facts determined by
the district court, he concluded the districting plan segregated
Manhattan racially and "[r]acial segregation that is state-sponsored should be nullified whatever may have been intended."79
From the standpoint of precedent, Wright is important
because it recognized that state action regarding federal congressional districts is susceptible to a challenge alleging the unconstitutional segregation of voters by race. From the standpoint of
legal theory, Justice Douglas' eloquent dissent forms the foundation for Shaw v. Reno.
71. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
72. Id . at 53. The non-white majority districts consisted of black voters ana
voters of Puerto Rican origin. Id. at 54.
73. Id. at 54.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 58.
76. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2826 (1993) (interpreting Wright).
77. Wright, 376 U.S. at 59 (Douglas, J ., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. Id . at 61. The most salient fact in Justice Douglas' factual determination
of segregation was that white voters constituted 94.9% in the majority white
districts-indicating a near total segregation. See id . at 59.
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United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey

United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,80 [hereinafter "UJO"] was the first case to address whether "the use of
racial criteria ... in [an] attempt to comply with Section Five of
the [VRA] and to secure the .approval of the Attorney General violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment."81 The collision
between the extreme remedy of the VRA and the Constitution
gave rise to a "highly fractured decision."82 The VRA explicitly
requires consideration of the effect of a voting procedure change
on racial minority groups. 83 Yet, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments forbid differentiation on account of race. 84
Section Five of the VRA covered King's County in New York.85
The Attorney General rejected the initial reapportionment plan
for this county because New York failed to show the plan did not
abridge the right to vote on account of race. 86 The N ew York legislature adopted a revised reapportionment plan which addressed
the Attorney General's concerns. 87 In the effort to obtain approval
from the Attorney General; the plan effectively divided a community of Hasidic Jews into two districts. 88 Subsequently, the Attorney General approved the plan. 89 The community of Hasidic Jews
challenged the revised plan. 90 Their complaint alleged the value
of their votes was diluted solely for the purpose of achieving a
80. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
81. Id. at 147.
82. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2829 (1993). UJO gave rise to three
separate opinions and one concurrence in part without opinion; Justice Marshall
did not take part in the case. UJO, 430 U.S. at 147.
83. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ:, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) {Harlan, J ., dissenting). But see Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); United States v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969). These cases, and others
like them, hold that race-conscious remedies are not always forbidden by the
Constitution. UJO, 430 U.S. at 170 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
85. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of what
"coverage" by the VRA entails.
86. UJO, 430 U.S. at 150. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the requirements of the VRA.
87. UJO, 430 U.S. at 150-51.
88. Id .
89. Id. at 151-52.
90. Id. at 152.
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racial quota of sixty-five percent non-white population in a disputed New York Assembly district. 91
The plurality opinion, written by Justice White,92 reached
several conclusions based on Supreme ·Court precedent. Relying
on two prior VRA cases, Beer v. United States 93 and City of Richmond v. United States, 94 the Justice determined the implementation of quotas is not per se unconstitutional and the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments do not mandate a per se rule against
using race as a factor in redistricting. 95 Because the plaintiffs did
not show New York did any more than required by Section Five
under the guidelines of Beer, the plurality found the plaintiffs
could not challenge the application of quotas in this case. 96 Justice White completed his analysis by maintaining that the plaintiffs suffered no constitutionally cognizable injury because New
York's plan did not represent a "slur or stigma with respect to
whites."97 An intentional reduction of white voting power is
proper in order to recognize minority voting power under the
remedial authority of the VRA.98
91. Id. The 1974 plan counted as minority districts only those which had
sixty-five percent or higher non-white pop).llation. Id. The New York Legislature
believed a sixty-five percent figure was the minimum population figure allowed
by the Justice Department. Id .
92 . .Justice White was joined in full only by Justice Stevens. Id. at 147.
93. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). This case upheld the "nonretrogression" principle
which required that minority voting strength be enhanced in order to satisfy
Section Five ofthe Voting Rights Act. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
94. 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (upholding the creation of minority districts which
"fairly [reflect] the strength of the Negro community").
95. UJO, 430 U.S. at 161. Justice White specifically stated: "[I]mplicit in Beer
and City of Richmond, then, is the proposition that the Constitution does not
prevent a State subject to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or
preserving black majorities in particular districts in order to ensure its
reapportionment plan complies with Section Five." Id. Justices Brennan and
Blackmun concurred in this assessment. Id. at 168-69.
96. Id. at 162-63.
97. Id. at 165-66. Justice White based his thinking on political
gerrymandering cases which held that no injury occurs merely because a vo~er's
candidate loses an election. Id. at 166; see also, Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124, 153-60 (1971). Justice Rehnquist was the only concurring justice with this
portion of the plurality opinion. UJO, 430 U.S. at 147.
98. UJO, 430 U.S. at 168. Justice White continued: "[W]e think it
[constitutionally] permissible for a State, employing sound districting principles
such as compactness and population equality, to attempt to prevent racial
minorities from ·being repeatedly outvoted by creating districts that will afford
fair representation to the members of those racial groups who are sufficiently
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Justice Brennan was content to leave the "thorny question"
answered by the last assertion in Justice White's opinion for
another day but concurred in the result. 99 Justice Stewart concurred separately by finding no violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments because there was no discriminatory purpose
or effect on the part of the N ew York Legislature. loo
Only Chief Justice Burger dissented from the judgment. lOl He
asserted that racial quotas are per se unconstitutional under the
rule established in Gomillion. 102 He further concluded the plurality opinion misread both the VRA and the holding in Beer. 103 In
his opinion, the decision "moves us one step farther away from a
truly homogenous society."104
Summation of the Court's decision in UJO is difficult in the
extreme. The only clear principle is the use of racial considerations is acceptable as an effort to comply with the VRA. The constitutionally tolerable limits of this use of race were left undefined
until Shaw v. Reno.
ANALYSIS
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A.

Justice O'Connor's Majority Opinion

The binding precedent created by the majority decision in
Shaw establishes the constitutionally tolerable limits to the broad
scope of the VRA. The hol~ing provides:
numerous and whose residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating
districts in which they will be the majority." Id . (emphasis added). The
emphasized language plays a large role in the majority decision in Shaw v. Reno,
113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
99. UJO, 430 U.S. at 171. Justice Brennan was particularly concerned with
the fact that the Court appeared to endorse a racial classification scheme under
the misguided, unwise, and uncons~itutional notion of benign discrimination. Id .
at 174-75. He concurred with the result, however, because the VRA,
implemented by the Attorney General on districts which had previously operated
under discriminatory voting procedures, "substantially minimizes the objections
to preferential treatment" of minority voters. Id. at 175. Justice Stewart joined
Justice Brennan's opinion but filed his own opinion as well. [d. at 16B.
100. Id . at 179. Justice Powell joined Justice Stewart's opinion which relied
solely on the fact the plan did not undervalue the votes of white vo~ers in King's
County as a whole. Id . at 180.
101. Id. at 180.
102. Id . at 181; see also supra text accompanying notes 55-70.
103. UJO, 430 U.S. at 183; see also supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
104. UJO , 430 U.S. at 187 . .
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A plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal
Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into
different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation
lacks sufficient justification. 105

In simpler terms, Shaw stands for the proposition that traditional
Equal Protection Clause analysis will apply even when reapportionment plans have been preapproved under the VRA, if those
plans appear to segregate voters along racial lines.106

1.

The Gateway to Strict Scrutiny

Justice O'Connor carefully limited the holding to redistricting
plans which "rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for the purposes of voting."107 In her view, the
claim put forth by those challenging the redistricting plan was
analytically distinct from prior "vote dilution" decisions. lOB Most
importantly, this claim was analytically distinct from that made
in UJO, the case relied upon by the district court below in granting summary judgment.l09 Here, North Carolina's redistricting
plan was constitutionally suspect because the new districts were
shaped in such a grotesque fashion to raise the eyebrows of the
Court as being potentially "unexplainable on grounds other than
race."110
Illogical appearance or-the legislative districts created by a
challenged reapportionment plan is the threshold requirement
plaintiffs' must meet in order to reach the fertile field of "strict
scrutiny." Once the plaintiff establishes the plan can only be
explainable as racial segregation, the State must show a "compelling interest" and a "narrowly tailored" statute. 111
105. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993).
106. Id . "State legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens because
of their race [must] be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest." Id. at 2824. In analysis under the Equal Protection Clause, it is well
established that use of raqial classification gives rise to "strict scrutiny." Sef!,
e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
107. Id. at 2824.
108. Id. at 2829.
109. Id .
110. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977); see also Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825.
111. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
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The rationale for this requirement lies in the pre-VRA cases
of Gomillion and Wright .112 Justice O'Connor found Gomillion
established that district lines w:hich were "obviously drawn for the
purpose of separating voters by race" demanded strict scrutiny
regardless of the underlying motivation.113 She further found
Wright to stand for the proposition that where voters of the same
race reside in close proximity, the motivations of compactness,
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions would be adequate to explain the districts on grounds other than race. 114
Clouding the issue is the Supreme Court's acknowledgement
that not all race-conscious decisionmaking is unconstitutional. 115
Apparently, the question becomes one of degree rather than a
brightline rule that race conscious decisionmaking in the realm of
redistricting is per se unconstitutional. The greater the influence
of race in the state decisionmaking process, the more likely the
chance that impermissible racial stereotyping will occur 116 and
the more likely that representatives will view theb.selves as representatives of one race rather than representatives for all the
voters in their district. 117
The Court gives little or no guidance as to what constitutes a
district which is "explairiable only in terms of race."118 They prefer, instead, to imply only that they will know it when they see
itY9 Under the facts of this case, an allegation of racial motivation combined with a map is sufficient to raise the issue, and, upon
remand, North Carolina has .the task of explaining the district in
112. See supra text accompanying notes 55-79.
113. Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2825.
114. Id. at 2826.
115. Id . at 2824.
116. Id. at 2827.
117. Id; see also Houston v. Lafayette County, No. 3:91CVI08-D-D, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18467, at *37-40 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 3, 1993) (discussing the
detrimental impact of "safe" minority-majority seats on the representation of the
minority community).
118. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826. For an excellent discussion of possible objective
standards which could be applied in deterrn.ining which districts violate the
Shaw holding, see Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms,
"Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993) (advocating use of computergenerated compactness criteria to analyze the allowable deviance from the
normal range).
119. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827. The Court apologetically falls back on
Justice Stevens' derivation of Justice Stewart's famous definition of obscenity in
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 755 (1983). Id.
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non-racial terms. 120 Any attempt to justify creation of the offensive congressional districts in other than racial terms will likely
fall on deaf ears on remand; in a strikingly similar case arising in
Louisiana and delayed pending the outcome of Shaw, the district
court flatly rejected all proffered justifications by the state as obviously pretextual. 121

2.

Strict Scrutiny Applied

B.

Once the State fails to explain a redistricting scheme in nonracial terms, the State must show a "compelling state interest" in
the creation of majority-minority districts. 122 Noting a redistricting plan which is approved under Section Five of the VRA may
still be held unconstitutional, 123 Justice O'Connor agreed that
compliance with Section Five constituted a "compelling state
interest."124
The Court also recognized the state could have a "compelling
state interest" in complying with Section Two of the VRA.125
Outside of the VRA, the State could assert a "compelling state
interest" in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. 126
In Shaw, none of these "compelling state interests" were developed in the district court, therefore, the questions are to be investigated on remand. 127
The Court gave no specific guidelines regarding sufficiency of
these potentially compelling interests. Justice O'Connor's discussion of the facts in Sha w raises more issues and answers less
questions. Judging from the tenor of her opinion, the Court will
strictly scrutinize challenged redistricting schemes, especially
120. [d. at 2832. In this regard, North Carolina has primarily two options.
The first is to redraw the legislative districts, thereby mooting the question. The
second will be to argue that the district is an attempt to create a predominantly
urban district and thus was not solely a race-based plan.
121. Hays v. Louisiana, No. 92-CV-1522, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18775, at *3545 (W.D. La. Dec. 28, 1993).
122. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830.
123. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
124. [d. at 2830. But see Hays, 1993 U.S. Dist. 18775, at *52 (assuming
without deciding that compliance with Section Five is a compelling state interest
but expressing doubts on the matter).
125. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831; For an explanation of Section Two, see supra
notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
126. Shaw , 113 S. Ct. at 2831; see also Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.s. 469,
490-92 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-82 (1986).
127. 113 S. Ct. at 2831.
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with regards to compliance with either Section Two or Section
Five of the VRA. 128
Even if a compelling state interest exists, the plan could only
be upheld if it was "narrowly tailored" to achieve that permissible
interest. 129 Under this prong of the strict scrutiny test, the state
must show it did no more than was necessary to prevent "nonretrogression."13o

B.

Dissenting Opinions
1.

Justice White's Dissent

Justice White, raising the most pressing question left unanswered by the majority opinion writes, "[S]imply stated: the
appellants have not presented a cognizable claim, because they
have not alleged a cognizable injury."131 The plaintiffs must
allege either deprivation outright of the right to vote or reduction
in a political or racial group's influence on the political process. 132
His rationale is that it is not possible to extricate political and
racial considerations from the redistricting process. 133 Therefore,
a clear injury must occur before the courts enter the byzantine
world of legislative redistricting. 134 Justice O'Connor failed to
address this "cognizable injury" question.
Justice White also objects strenuously to the majority utilizing bizarrely shaped districts as the criterion for applying strict
scrutiny because strangely shaped legislative districts are not, in
and of themselves, clearly indicative of unconstitutional racial
128. See, e.g., Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824-32; see also Hays, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18775, at *52-64.
.
129. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831.
130. [d . Because North Carolina had no majority-minority congressional
districts prior to the redistricting and two afterwards, it was implied the General
Assembly went far beyond the requirements of "non-retrogression." [d.; see also
Hays, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18775, at *56. For a discussion of "nonretrogression," see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
131. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
132. [d. (citing Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1974); Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55 (1980)).
133. See id. at 2834-35.
134. [d . Indeed, it has been suggested that even judicial decisions on the
matter of redistricting are infused with partisan political concerns. Grofman,
supra note 48, at 1249-56. These concerns center upon a predominantly
Republican bench and previously Republican Department of .Justice showing
great favor to minority voting rights. [d .

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994

17

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 3

474

CAMPBELL

LAw

REVIEW

[Vol. 16:457

1994]

gerrymandering. 135 His theory relies on the assertion that the
Constitution is concerned with the effects of racial segregation and
not merely the unsightly appearance of such segregation. The
majority's discussion of the effects of "political apartheid" as being
an impermissible form of racial stereotyping which thereby brings
about unconstitutional effects is very persuasive in answer to Justice White's argument. 136

2. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens' dissent focuses on his assertion that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause may occur when a group in
power uses this power solely to enhance its political strength. 137
His theory applies to all types of group classifications including
racial, political, and ethnic. 138 According to the majority opinion,
Justice Steven's approach is fatally flawed because racial classifications, by the language of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, are subject to a higher level of scrutiny under the
Constitution and are suspect regardless of which race is
benefitted. 139

4.

3. Justice Souter's Dissent
Justice Souter's dissent is based upon the same principles as
Justice White's dissent, namely that injury in the form of vote
dilution must be shown before a redistricting plan may be ruled
unconstitutional,140 According.. to Justice Souter's theory, by
drawing district lines to favor minority voters, majority voters
have had no constitutional rights infringed upon because the~r
opportunities to participate in the process have not been diminished. 141 Because there is no infringement of a constitutional
right due to gerrymandering, these challenges should be considered in a category distinct from traditional Equal Protection analysis and subject to a lesser degree of scrutiny than strict. 142

c.

court in
Ahoskie,
black maj
council
This plan 1
under
people

135. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2840. "Given two districts drawn on similar, racebased grounds, the one does not become more injurious than the other simply by
virtue of being snake-like, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned and
absent any evidence of differential racial impact." [d. at 2841.
136. See id . at 2827.
137. [d. at 2844.
138. [d.
139. [d . at 2829.
140. [d. at 2846.
141. [d.
142. [d . at 2846-48.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss3/3

145.
146.
147.
148.

18

See, i
No.
[d. at
[d. at

McKeller: The Long and Winding Road: Redistricting in Light of <em>Shaw v.

[Vol. 16:457

. assertion that the
cial segregation and
h segregation. The
apartheid" as being
rhich thereby brings
ve in answer to J us-

1994]

SHAW V. RENO

Justice O'Connor answers this attack by responding that racial
classifications which separate voters into racial blocs create "special harms that are not present in our vote dilution cases," such as
enhancing racial stereotypes and encouraging elected officials to
represent only one race rather than all their constituents. 143
These "harms" necessitate a stricter scrutiny of the purpose and
means used by the State. 144
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Net Result of the Dissenting Opinions

In analyzing most Supreme Court decisions, it is helpful to
interpret the dissenting opinions which try to modify or moderate
the impact of the majority opinion. However, this approach is
unhelpful in Shaw because each of the dissenters objects forcefully to the main tenet of the majority opinion - a constitutional
claim arises from egregious drawing of district lines which are
explainable only by reference to race.
Even so, Justice O'Connor's failure to address the suggestions
of Justices White and Souter that no cognizable injury occurred
may signal a limitation on the holding. This limitation arguably
is the districts must be so incredibly bizarre (e.g. North Carolina's
Twelfth District) to draw the absolutely unavoidable conclusion
that impermissible racial stereotyping occurred. 145

c.

Recommendations for Local Redistricting Officials

The substantial ifupact of Shaw is already beginning to
appear. In a case decided just seventeen days after the Shaw
opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals used the decision to
reject a racially motivated town council plan in Hines v. Mayor of
Ahoskie .146 In Hines, the court of appeals upheld the district
court in rejecting an alternative redistricting plan for the town of
Ahoskie, North Carolina. 147 The original plan provided for two
black majority town council districts and two white majority town
council districts with a fifth council member elected at-Iarge. 148
This plan had received pre-clearance from the Attorney General
under Section Five of the VRA but was objected to by black townspeople who contended that an alternative plan with three majority
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

[d. at 2828.
[d.
See, e.g., id. at 2848 (Souter, J., dissenting).
No. 92-2590, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17587, at *24 (4th Cir. July 15,1993).
[d. at *2.
[d. at *4.
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black districts and two majority white districts should be created. 149 The town has 50.5% black population but only 45.6%
black voting-age population. 150 The district court found that creation of three majority black districts would overrepresent the
black population but that based on past voting patterns the atlarge district would effectively overrepresent the white population. 151 The district court solved the dilemma by eliminating the
at-large district leaving only four town council districts. 152
The court of appeals, after reinstating the original plan,
upheld the district court's rejection of the three black district
alternative plan by asserting Shaw stood for the proposition that
when the only motivation for a districting plan is racial and no
sufficient justification exists, the plan violates the equal protection
rights of white voters.153 Though this is probably too broad a reading of the holding in Shaw, it is indicative of the rapid and violent
impact of the case. 154 As Hines indicates, the Shaw decision will
have a bearing on districting for local elections which is immediate and drastic. 155

First Recommendation: Continued Compliance
It is important for local officials to ensure compliance with the
VRA as applied to their particular counties. Forty counties in
149. Id.
150. Id. at *2.
151. Id. at *7.
152. Id. at *7-9.
153. Id. at *23.
154. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, N. C. Case Stirs Up Other Legal Challenges to
Redistricting, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 27, 1994, at 19A.
'l'his article focuses on the veritable explosion of redistricting litigation following
Shaw. Id. The primary focus of the redistricting challenges is congressional
districts but local election districts, especially in hotly contested political regions,
are also among the targets. Id.
155. The effect will be long-lasting as well. The majority opinion, written by
Justice O'Connor, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2819 (1993). The
core of the majority, therefore, consists of relatively young Justices who, in all
probability, will influence the Court for a long time.
The dissenters, in contrast, consist of Justice White (submitting this opinion
on his last day on the Court), Justice Blackmun (who recently announced his
retirement), Justice Stevens (age 73), and Justice Souter (the only dissenter
appointed later than 1975 and under 70 years old).
.
It is not yet' possible to assess the impact that the appointment of Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg will have on the principles established in Shaw.
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North Carolina must comply with Section Five of the VRA.156 The
principle of "non-retrogression" still applies in those counties;
therefore, minority voters must not lose electoral strength under
any new districting plan. 157
Section Two of the VRA applies to all counties. 158 It is necessary, therefore, to satisfy the Thornburg v. Gingles test for vote
dilution as well. 159 The requirement of continued compliance
results in there being no shortcut around the Shaw holding by
creating completely at-large or multi-member districts.

Recommendation: Traditional Redistricting Principles
The specific holding in Shaw applying strict scrutiny to voting
districts will come into play only if the districts drawn can be
explained solely in racial terms. 160 Use of the traditional districting principles of contiguity, compactness, and respect for political
subdivisions will, more likely than not, remove the districting
plan from the suspect category.
As much as possible, town, township, and precinct boundaries
should be honored. Within towns, neighborhood subdivisions
should be split only if absolutely necessary. Any failure to use
traditional districting tools must have a sufficient, non-racial,
justification or be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
interest. 161

Third Recommendation: Reduce Political Influence

'Ler Legal Challenges to
Feb. 27, 1994, at 19A.
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~ity opinion, written by
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submitting this opinion
recently announced his
ter (the only disseIl:ter
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shed in Shaw.

It is apparently contrary to the basic laws of the political
world to have redistricting conducted solely on a non-partisan
basis, but the Shaw decision indirectly encourages it. It would be
naive to assert that most judicial redistricting battles are fought
for the purely altruistic reason of racial equality. They are fought
because an interest group senses an opportunity to improve its
position vis-a-vis its opponent. Twisting the VRA into serving
purely political ends has turned out to be child's play. Though left
156. See supra note 41.
157. See supra note 46 and accompanying text for a discussion of "nonretrogression. "
158. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 105-22 and accompanying text.
161. This is not to suggest that town officials should play ~'hide the ball" with
the reasoning for districting decisions but that the justification behind every line
drawn should be considered.
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unstated, implications arise from Shaw that there are constitutional limits to political gameplaying.162
A reduction of political pressure to protect incumbents or
"pair"163 political enemies would make the walk between the VRA
strictures and the rules established in Shaw immeasurably eas- '
ier. Because political considerations have little to do with the constitutionally-approved redistricting tools of contiguity,
compactness, and community of interest, their removal will
increase reliance on these traditional tools and on the VRA
requirements alone. 164 In turn, this will reduce the cl~ances of
creating a district which is so ridiculous that it can only be
explained as racially motivated.
Unrealistic though it may be, the best solution appears for a
redistricting commission or committee to be established with
membership equally divided among all political groups with a
deciding member chosen by a coin flip or lottery. The commis'sion
will be charged only with establishing procedures and districts for
elections. For those counties where "non-partisan" elections are
held, interest groups still develop and should be accounted for in
organizing the commission. 165 The deciding member could be "chosen" on the same schedule as elections are held to ensure that no
single political group unfairly retains control for too long.
Also, to reduce political pressures, the county should engage
an outside redistricting consultant who is provided only with
"legitimate" data, such.- as population, township lines, neighborhoods. Then, the consultant can develop the ideal model plan
which, most likely, will be free from outside political pressure.
This method has been approved of in recent cases. 166
162. See, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry Into the
Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 652 (1993).
163. "Pairing" is the process of placing two incumbents of the opposing party in
the same district thereby reducing the number of incumbents from the opposing
party. Grofman, supra note 48 at 1251.
164. See, e.g., Joseph Neff and Rob Christiansen, Insider Tells of the Politics
Behind Districts, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), March 31, 1994, at
1A. The political influence on North Carolina's challenged redistricting plan is
illustrated by a list of the instructions given to the chief mapmaker for the
General Assembly; none of them are related to race. Id. at 16A.
165. In actuality, there is probably no such thing as a truly "non-partisan"
election. The political animal generally travels in a pack.
166. See, e.g., Emison v. Growe, 782 F. Supp. 427 (D. Minn. 1992); see also
Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 TEX L. REV. 1643, 1696-1702 (1993) (describing the
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CONCLUSION

Just as local officials finally became comfortable about complying with the requirements of the VRA, the Supreme Court has
drawn a line on the extent of that Act. Local districting plans may
now be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution if "the legislation, though race-neutral
on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other
than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the
basis ofrace."167 The precise measurement of "rationality" has not
been established but certainly what is permissible under the VRA
has been narrowed.
The Court has taken a step towards a "color-blind" Constitution but has not held its hand out to help local officials follow.
Trapped between the two great mountains of the VRA and the
Shaw decision, local redistricters must follow a long and winding
road in the dark and fog. This note may provide some temporary
light to guide the way but the full revelation of where the
Supreme Court is leading is yet to come.

Charles W. McKeller
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167. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993).
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